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Documents authored by Kremer, Steve

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2011.204
Transforming Password Protocols to Compose

Authors: Céline Chevalier, Stéphanie Delaune, and Steve Kremer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 13, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2011)

Abstract
Formal, symbolic techniques are extremely useful for modelling and analysing security protocols. They improved our understanding of security protocols, allowed to discover flaws, and also provide support for protocol design. However, such analyses usually consider that the protocol is executed in isolation or assume a bounded number of protocol sessions. Hence, no security guarantee is provided when the protocol is executed in a more complex environment. In this paper, we study whether password protocols can be safely composed, even when a same password is reused. More precisely, we present a transformation which maps a password protocol that is secure for a single protocol session (a decidable problem) to a protocol that is secure for an unbounded number of sessions. Our result provides an effective strategy to design secure password protocols: (i) design a protocol intended to be secure for one protocol session; (ii) apply our transformation and obtain a protocol which is secure for an unbounded number of sessions. Our technique also applies to compose different password protocols allowing us to obtain both inter-protocol and inter-session composition.
Cite as

Céline Chevalier, Stéphanie Delaune, and Steve Kremer. Transforming Password Protocols to Compose. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2011). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 13, pp. 204-216, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2011)

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@InProceedings{chevalier_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2011.204,
  author =	{Chevalier, C\'{e}line and Delaune, St\'{e}phanie and Kremer, Steve},
  title =	{{Transforming Password Protocols to Compose}},
  booktitle =	{IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2011)},
  pages =	{204--216},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-34-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2011},
  volume =	{13},
  editor =	{Chakraborty, Supratik and Kumar, Amit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2011.204},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-33273},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2011.204},
  annote =	{Keywords: Security, cryptographic protocols, composition}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2316
Simulation based security in the applied pi calculus

Authors: Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Olivier Pereira

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 4, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (2009)

Abstract
We present a symbolic framework for refinement and composition of security protocols. The framework uses the notion of ideal functionalities. These are abstract systems which are secure by construction and which can be combined into larger systems. They can be separately refined in order to obtain concrete protocols implementing them. Our work builds on ideas from the ``trusted party paradigm'' used in computational cryptography models. The underlying language we use is the applied pi calculus which is a general language for specifying security protocols. In our framework we can express the different standard flavours of simulation-based security which happen to all coincide. We illustrate our framework on an authentication functionality which can be realized using the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. For this we need to define an ideal functionality for asymmetric encryption and its realization. We show a joint state result for this functionality which allows composition (even though the same key material is reused) using a tagging mechanism.
Cite as

Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Olivier Pereira. Simulation based security in the applied pi calculus. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 4, pp. 169-180, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)

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@InProceedings{delaune_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2316,
  author =	{Delaune, St\'{e}phanie and Kremer, Steve and Pereira, Olivier},
  title =	{{Simulation based security in the applied pi calculus}},
  booktitle =	{IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science},
  pages =	{169--180},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-13-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{4},
  editor =	{Kannan, Ravi and Narayan Kumar, K.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2316},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-23163},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2316},
  annote =	{Keywords: Simulation based security, applied pi calculus, joint state theorem, authentication protocols}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07421.1
07421 Abstracts Collection – Formal Protocol Verification Applied

Authors: Liqun Chen, Steve Kremer, and Mark D. Ryan

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7421, Formal Protocol Verification Applied (2008)

Abstract
From 14/10/2007 to 19/10/2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07421 ``Formal Protocol Verification Applied'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Cite as

Liqun Chen, Steve Kremer, and Mark D. Ryan. 07421 Abstracts Collection – Formal Protocol Verification Applied. In Formal Protocol Verification Applied. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7421, pp. 1-13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:DagSemProc.07421.1,
  author =	{Chen, Liqun and Kremer, Steve and Ryan, Mark D.},
  title =	{{07421 Abstracts Collection – Formal Protocol Verification Applied}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Protocol Verification Applied},
  pages =	{1--13},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7421},
  editor =	{Liqun Chen and Steve Kremer and Mark D. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07421.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-14196},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07421.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Security protocols, formal verification, trusted computing, biometrics, security of mobile computing, electronic voting, payment systems}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07421.2
07421 Executive Summary – Formal Protocol Verification Applied

Authors: Liqun Chen, Steve Kremer, and Mark D. Ryan

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7421, Formal Protocol Verification Applied (2008)

Abstract
Security protocols are a core part of distributed computing systems, and are part of our everyday life since they are used in web servers, email, mobile phones, bank transactions, etc. However, security protocols are notoriously difficult to get right. There are many cases of protocols which are proposed and considered secure for many years, but later found to have security flaws. Formal methods offer a promising way for automated security analysis of protocols. While there have been considerable advances in this area, most techniques have only been applied to academic case studies and security properties such as secrecy and authentication. The seminar brought together researchers deploying security protocols in new application areas, cryptographers, and researchers from formal methods who analyse security protocols. The interaction between researchers from these different communities aims to open new research topics, e.g., identify new security properties that need verification and refine abstractions of the abstract models of crytpographic primitives.
Cite as

Liqun Chen, Steve Kremer, and Mark D. Ryan. 07421 Executive Summary – Formal Protocol Verification Applied. In Formal Protocol Verification Applied. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7421, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)

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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:DagSemProc.07421.2,
  author =	{Chen, Liqun and Kremer, Steve and Ryan, Mark D.},
  title =	{{07421 Executive Summary – Formal Protocol Verification Applied}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Protocol Verification Applied},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7421},
  editor =	{Liqun Chen and Steve Kremer and Mark D. Ryan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07421.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-14186},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07421.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Security protocols, formal verification, trusted computing, biometrics, security of mobile computing, electronic voting, payment systems}
}
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